Murabaha and defects
The sale price is fixed at contract. Escrow holds the merchant share through the defect window.
5 Contract mappings
Liquidity commitments
Share token: vMDB
Providers deposit into the vault and receive shares of the pool. Early bands and lock length change a rebate weight. They are not a promised return.
Non-Reopening Cold-Start Multipliers
The 5x (Diamond), 3x (Gold), and 2x (Silver) multipliers apply exclusively to the initial $5,000,000 in committed liquidity. The counter never rolls back, even after commitments mature and capital is redeemed. All subsequent allocations permanently enter at the 1x Bronze baseline. Your total rebate weight = Genesis Multiplier × Lock Term Weight (e.g. 5x × 1.0x = 5.0x max).
Compound Formula:Effective Weight = Tranche Multiplier × Term Weight(e.g. Diamond 5x × 12m 1.0x = 5.0x Maximum Weight)
Capital bands
Marginal weight: 5x
Pool fill
0.00USDT
0 / 5,000,000 USDT
| Capital bands | Pool range | Rebate weight | Quota Policy |
|---|---|---|---|
| Diamond | 0 – 500,000 | 5xdesign value | ONE-TIME · NEVER REOPENS |
| Gold | 500,000 – 2,000,000 | 3xdesign value | ONE-TIME · NEVER REOPENS |
| Silver | 2,000,000 – 5,000,000 | 2xdesign value | ONE-TIME · NEVER REOPENS |
| Bronze | 5,000,000 – Open | 1xdesign value | PERMANENT BASELINE |
3 · Lock weights
Square-root of months over twelve.
6 · Lock weights
Square-root of months over twelve.
12 · Lock weights
Square-root of months over twelve.
Live trade telemetry
What the gateway publishes
These figures are the public protocol feed. They are not a realised yield, a default rate, or a sector mix. Takaful and gharamah exist on the contract and are closed in the product.
Originated notes
0
Live telemetry · CheckoutOrder rows with a note
On-chain notes
0
Live telemetry · token_id present
GMV
0 TRY
Live telemetry · originated + direct volume
Direct volume
0 TRY
Live telemetry · payment_mode DIRECT
Investor console and liquidity
How portfolios are managed today
Retail and institutional exits follow the vault and gateway that are actually shipped. There is no licensed bank off-ramp, no named MPC custodian, and no hardware quorum in this release.
Retail: vault shares and a queued redeem
ERC-4626 · FIFO queue · no bank wireStep 01
Account access
Retail Karma sessions use the checkout identity already on the product. A seedless Face ID bank login is not part of this release.
Session identity?
Step 02
Portfolio figures
Share value and pool totals come from protocol telemetry. Design-band weights are labelled as configuration, not as a live yield.
Telemetry?
Step 03
Redeem request
A redeem is a vault request. If cash is not sitting in the vault, the request joins the FIFO queue as receivables settle.
FIFO queue?
Step 04
Settlement rail
There is no licensed Turkish FAST payout to a named domestic bank in this product. Fiat off-ramp partners are not contracted.
Off-ramp?
Published dossiers
Fiqh and code map
Read dossier →
DOSSIER SC-SS03-OIC51
Ibra and penalties
Unearned profit is waived on early payoff. Deterrence, if any, is purified away from the vault.
3 Contract mappings
DOSSIER SC-SS09-SS39
Service, shield, pledge
Service plans, the mutual reserve, and bounded collateral sit beside the sale note.
4 Contract mappings
Institutional Custody & Smart Contract Defense
How Institutional Capital is Safeguarded: The 5-Layer Anti-Hack Matrix
MudarabahVault.sol · Non-CustodialOpenZeppelin libraries; independent audit planned
Pool capital sits in the non-custodial MudarabahVault. No regulated MPC custody partner is in use. Contract pause exists for operator and oracle divergence. An independent audit is planned.
01
Non-custodial vault
Q: Can Karma or ShariaCo operators arbitrarily withdraw and drain pool assets?
No admin drain−
MudarabahVault has no function for operators to send capital to an arbitrary address. That is not a substitute for an independent audit.
Capital can ONLY exit the vault upon the generation of a verified MurabahaNFT trade note and direct settlement to authenticated physical goods suppliers. Even protocol architects cannot divert funds.
✓ Code-Enforced Lock✓ Direct Merchant Settlement✓ Zero Custody Exposure
Non-Custodial Architecture?
02
Institutional key policy (planned)
Q: How is institutional size managed? What happens if a key is compromised?
No custody partner+
03
Smart Contract Exploit Shield (ReentrancyGuard & SafeERC20)
Q: Can attackers exploit flash-loans or re-entrancy vectors to drain pool liquidity?
OpenZeppelin libraries; independent audit planned+
04
Automated Circuit Breaker (RegimeGate Fast-Freeze)
Q: What happens during a market flash-crash, oracle divergence, or anomalous flow?
Contract pause+
05
Takaful first-loss reserve
Q: What protects LP principal against operational bottlenecks or merchant defaults?
Defined on-contract, closed in product+
Risk & Downside Protection Matrix
Traditional DeFi Risk vs. ShariaCo Institutional Architecture
Addressing the 5 critical security questions evaluated by LP Treasuries and CFOs:
| Attack / Risk Vector | Conventional Crypto / DeFi | ShariaCo Institutional Matrix |
|---|---|---|
| Operator Rug-Pull / Insider Drain | ✕High Risk — Admin private keys can drain liquidity pools | ✓Non-custodial vault — no admin drain function; independent audit planned. |
| Single Private Key Theft | ✕Critical Risk — Compromise of one key results in total loss | ✓No custody partner; pause exists on the contract. |
| Flash-Loan & Exploit Loops | ✕Prevalent — Billions lost in unaudited smart contracts | ✓OpenZeppelin libraries; independent audit planned. |
| Market Flash-Crash & Oracle Drift | ✕Severe Loss — Cascading liquidations dissolve capital | ✓Contract pause on operator or oracle divergence; no millisecond SLA. |
| Counterparty Default & Loss | ✕100% Absorbed by Investor — Zero remediation layer | ✓Takaful is defined on the contract and closed in the product. There is no principal guarantee. |